

**ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS UNDER SWEDISH PRESIDENCY 2001**

**UNICE POSITION PAPER**

**1. INTRODUCTION**

European business strongly supports enlargement of the European Union. It is an historic opportunity to spread peace and prosperity to a wider part of the European continent. Thanks to free-trade provisions of the Association Agreements between EU and candidate countries and the prospect of enlargement, EU and candidate country economies are already well integrated. However, important additional benefits are to be reaped from enlargement:

- \* Improved investment climate in candidate countries:
- \* Larger Internal Market
- \* Removal of remaining tariffs and trade barriers.

All these benefits will lead to increased economic growth and prosperity in Member States, as well as in candidate countries.

However, for these benefits to be grasped, a number of conditions have to be fulfilled:

- \* Undistorted competition and a well functioning Internal Market;
- \* An institutional and financial framework that would allow up to 28 members in the EU.

European business has a great stake in the enlargement process. UNICE would therefore like to express its views on what it expects of the accession negotiations during the Swedish Presidency.<sup>1</sup>

UNICE welcomes the European Commission's 2000 Enlargement Strategy Paper, endorsed by the 7-9 December 2000 European Council in Nice, notably outlining:

- \* A strategy for transitional measures; and
- \* A road map for accession negotiations.

UNICE also welcomes the Swedish Presidency's work programme on enlargement, notably the objective of paving the way for a political break-through in the accession negotiations, endeavouring to provisionally close as many chapters as possible with all candidate countries.

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<sup>1</sup> This position paper completes the UNICE Position Paper on Enlargement, published 2 October 2000. The position paper, as other official UNICE documents, is accessible at [www.unice.org](http://www.unice.org).

## 2. POLICY ON TRANSITIONAL MEASURES

UNICE outlined its overall policy on transitional measures in its 2 October 2000 Position Paper on Enlargement: “The most important aspect of the accession negotiations is that the Internal Market and flanking policies are not distorted. However, transition periods may need to be accepted in certain cases. If so, they should be limited in scope and in time and combined with strict conditions for full application of the *acquis*. At the moment of entry, EU law is not only to be transposed into national law but also to be implemented and consistently enforced in candidate countries as required by the Copenhagen criteria.”

To facilitate negotiations on transitional measures, the European Commission has suggested that candidate countries’ requests for transitional measures be divided into three categories, depending on their effect on competition or the functioning of the Internal Market, as well as their time and scope:

- a) Acceptable, i.e. measures that are limited in time and scope and do not have any significant impact;
- b) Negotiable, i.e. measures with a more significant impact;
- c) Unacceptable, i.e. measures posing fundamental problems.

UNICE welcomes this proposal, which lays the ground for a clearer EU policy on transitional measures. Even though some transitional measures appear inevitable, it shares the Commission’s approach that, before any such requests are granted to candidate countries, it is important to evaluate carefully any effects they will have on competition, the functioning of the Internal Market. UNICE believes that also the effects on the unified nature of the Common Commercial Policy should be taken into consideration.

However, UNICE would like the Commission to specify the concepts “significant impact” or “fundamental problems”. Although we understand the difficulty in defining these two terms, it is important that the Union’s policy in this field is clear and consistent, and based on objective criteria. It is the view of European business that any measure making it possible for a Member State not to apply the Internal Market *acquis* entails a negative impact, as this would hamper the free flow of goods, capital, services and/or persons. Any measure that allows a Member State not to apply the Community competition policy will distort competition just in the same way that any measure that opens the way for a different trade regime with third countries threatens the unified nature of the common commercial policy. Thus, it is important to evaluate each of the requests for transitional measures individually on the basis of a clear and consistent understanding of what is meant by “significant impact” and “fundamental problems”.

From a business perspective, transitional measures granted to candidate countries must be limited in time and scope, combined with strict conditions for full application of the *acquis*. Their impact on competition and the functioning of the Internal Market must not outweigh the economic benefits of an enlarged internal market.

### 3. COMMENTS ON INDIVIDUAL REQUESTS FOR TRANSITIONAL MEASURES IN THE CHAPTERS TO BE NEGOTIATED DURING THE SWEDISH PRESIDENCY

According to the road map outlined in the 2000 Strategy Paper, during the first semester of 2001 common positions are to be defined, including positions on requests for transitional measures, with a view to closing provisionally the following chapters with the most advanced countries: Free movement of goods, Free movement of persons, Freedom to provide services, Free movement of capital, Company law, Social policy and employment, Culture and audio-visual policy, Environment and External relations.

Below is presented the business evaluation of some of the major transitional measures that, according to UNICE's information, candidate countries have requested as regards the aforementioned chapters (except Free movement of persons and Social policy and employment)<sup>2</sup>. Requests evaluated as acceptable are measures that UNICE believes can be included in the accession treaty without negotiations on substance, whereas requests judged to be unacceptable should be withdrawn unconditionally. Negotiable requests can be discussed, under certain circumstances, with a view to negotiations leading to reduction of their scope and/or duration, or to other modifications to make the requested measure acceptable.

Only the requests made by those candidate countries with which negotiations on the chapters in question have been opened are included in this position paper. Please note that a candidate country may submit a position paper on a chapter, which has not yet been opened. The requests made by those candidate countries which have not yet started negotiations on the chapters in question will be commented on at a later stage. The table at annex sets out which chapters have been opened/provisionally closed with which candidate countries.

In the enlargement negotiations, each candidate country has set itself a target date for accession. When asking for transitional measures, they assume that they will accede to the EU at that date. Thus, if a country asks for a five-year transition period, it plans not to apply the part of the *acquis* in question until five years after that date. For the sake of clarity and to make it possible to comment on specific requests for transitional measures as expressed by candidate countries, UNICE's comments below follow the same reasoning, assuming that candidate countries join the Union on their target dates. By adopting this approach, UNICE does not wish to pass judgment on the desirability or feasibility of these dates.

#### Candidate countries' target dates for accession to the EU

|                  |               |                   |                |                 |                 |
|------------------|---------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| <b>Bulgaria</b>  | <b>Cyprus</b> | <b>Czech Rep.</b> | <b>Estonia</b> | <b>Hungary</b>  | <b>Latvia</b>   |
| 1 Jan. 2007      | 1 Jan. 2003   | 1 Jan. 2003       | 1 Jan. 2003    | 1 Jan. 2003     | 1 Jan. 2003     |
| <b>Lithuania</b> | <b>Malta</b>  | <b>Poland</b>     | <b>Romania</b> | <b>Slovakia</b> | <b>Slovenia</b> |
| 1 Jan. 2004      | 1 Jan. 2003   | 1 Jan. 2003       | 1 Jan. 2007    | 1 Jan. 2004     | 1 Jan. 2003     |

<sup>2</sup> A position paper on transitional measures as regards the Free movement of persons and Social policy and employment is under preparation.

### 3.1 Free movement of goods

| Transitional measure  | Country/ies | UNICE Position on the request                      | Motivation   |
|---|-------------|--|--|
| 5-year transition period for the application of the acquis on regulatory data protection. | Hungary     | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {x} | Any new Member State not having regulatory data protection equivalent to other Member States would pose a fundamental problem to the free flow of goods. The request is therefore unacceptable. This standpoint is further supported by the fact that Hungary has not met its obligations in this area under the Europe agreement and TRIPs agreement. |

### 3.2 Free movement of services

| Transitional measure   | Country/ies   | UNICE Position on the request                                   | Motivation   |
|--|---|---|--|
| Exclusion of certain credit institutions from the scope of banking directives.   | Czech Republic,<br>Cyprus,<br>Hungary,<br>Poland,<br>Slovenia<br>Lithuania,<br>Latvia | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {x}<br>Unacceptable {}              | Excluding certain credit institutions from the scope of banking directives could create more favourable conditions for these institutions than for others, thus having a significant impact on competition. However, if the present market share of the institutions in question is insignificant, and no sharp increase can be seen in the future an exclusion from the scope of banking directives could be accepted. In some countries, where the market share of such institutions is already significant or even high, other solutions must be found. |
| Restrictions on the acquisition of real estate, which will affect the freedom of establishment (see free movement of capital below). | Czech Republic<br>Hungary<br>Poland   | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {x} <sup>3</sup> | Restrictions to the acquisition of land for commercial use are unacceptable (see below under Free movement of capital). Restrictions on the acquisition of land for personal use, which should be considered separately, are negotiable, unless they hinder the freedom of establishment.  |

<sup>3</sup> Restrictions to the acquisition of land for personal use could be negotiable.

|   |   |  |  |
|---|---|--|--|
| Transitional period regarding the Deposit Guarantee Scheme and/or Investor Compensation Scheme. | Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {x}<br>Unacceptable {} | Credit institutions that do not follow the deposit guarantee scheme would have a competitive advantage compared with those that do, since they will not have to bear the costs for the scheme. Whether such a transitional measure will have a significant impact on competition or not, or even pose a fundamental problem to competition, depends on its scope and time. The absence of an Investor Compensation Scheme would hamper the free flow of capital. Whether this will have a significant impact, or pose a fundamental problem depends on the scope of the measure. |
|---|---|--|--|

### 3.3 Free movement of capital

| Transitional measure   | Country/ies  | UNICE Position on the request                                   | Motivation  |
|--|--|---|---|
| Various restrictions to acquisition of real estate by community and third country nationals and companies. | Czech Rep. Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Malta Slovakia, Poland, Slovenia | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {x} <sup>4</sup> | Restrictions on the acquisition of land by EU nationals are in breach with one of the main principles of the Internal Market. Any restrictions to the purchase of real estate for commercial purposes would pose fundamental problems for the free flow of capital. Restrictions on the acquisition of land for personal use, which should be considered separately, are negotiable, unless they hinder the freedom of establishment. |

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

### 3.4 Company law (including Intellectual and industrial property rights)

| Transitional measure   | Country/ies | UNICE Position on the request                      | Motivation   |
|--|-------------|--|--|
| Request not to grant supplementary protection certificates to medicines until 5 years after accession. | Hungary     | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {x} | The measure would exacerbate the non-uniformity of pharmaceutical patent protection in candidate countries and actually mean that complete harmonisation of patent and SPC dates would not be achieved by Hungary until the 2020s – more than 15 years after Hungary's target date for accession. The measure would then pose fundamental problems for the free flow of goods and is therefore unacceptable. |

### 3.5 External relations

| Transitional measure   | Country/ies | UNICE Position on the request                      | Motivation   |
|--|-------------|--|--|
| 10-year transitional periods to maintain preferential trade agreements with Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYROM.   | Slovenia    | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {x} | Even though the EU, in the framework of the Stability Pact, has granted asymmetrical trade access to its markets to the third countries concerned, the measure requested would disrupt the unified nature of the common commercial policy and is therefore unacceptable. |
| Might request to maintain its preferential trade regime with FYROM.  | Bulgaria    | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {x} | Even though the EU, in the framework of the Stability Pact, has granted asymmetrical trade access to its markets to the third countries concerned, the measure requested would disrupt the unified nature of the common commercial policy and is therefore unacceptable. |
| Maintain free trade in agricultural products with Lithuania and Estonia in the event that these countries do not accede to the EU at the same time as Latvia | Latvia      | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {x} | The measure would clearly pose a fundamental problem to the unified nature of the Common Commercial Policy.  |

### 3.6 Environment

The aim of the negotiations on the chapter on environmental policy, as on all other chapters, must be that candidate countries apply the *acquis* from the date of accession. The environmental chapter is key to business considering the environmental issues at stake, significant impacts on health must be avoided. At the same time, it is important to strike a balance between the benefits of a wider Internal Market and disturbances created by transitional measures. Environment has been identified as one of the chapters which will cause most problems for candidate countries in terms of implementation, mainly due to the costs involved. However, as UNICE argues in its October 2000 Position Paper on Enlargement, the implementation costs need not be so high, and the burden on public finances could be alleviated:

- 1) In order for candidate country companies to be able to compete in the EU internal market, they will have to renew or replace much of their production equipment. Newer production equipment can be designed with inherent features to control emissions to higher environmental standards. Much of the cost of the environmental adjustments in the private sector will therefore not be charged to the "environment account", but to the regular "investment account";
- 2) Governments could lower the burden on their budgets by adjusting prices for utilities to cover necessary investments, and by privatising public utilities.

Against this background, a number of overriding principles should guide the EU's approach to candidate countries requests for transitional measures in the area of environmental *acquis*:

- \* No unlimited exemptions (derogations) should be accepted;
- \* Only clearly motivated transitional measures, not requested for commercial or competitive reasons, can be granted;
- \* The maximum scope in time for any transitional measures should be five years. This, however, does not mean that requests for longer transitional measures cannot be negotiated under certain circumstances, with a view to limiting their scope in time;
- \* The measure's effect on the environment, and in particular on human health, must be carefully examined;
- \* The measure's effect on trade and competition in the Internal Market must be considered. Thus, any exemption has to be clearly specified case by case;
- \* Requests for transitional measures on framework directives are unacceptable;
- \* A difference between new plants and those already in operation should be made. Thus, transitional periods for new installations coming into operation after accession are unacceptable;
- \* Any transitional measure granted should be accompanied by a detailed action plan for full implementation of the directive, with clear timetables and with appropriate resources set aside for this purpose;
- \* All new investments should be in line with the *acquis*, since this is already known to candidate countries.

### 3.6.1 Packaging and packaging waste: Directive 94/62/EC

The directive imposes costs on companies and therefore affects the conditions for business. Long transition periods could have a significant impact on competition. In general, exemptions from the directive are not necessary since target values for recovery and recycling will have to be negotiated per se, and compliance therefore depends on how challenging the targets are.

However, since no dangerous impact on health can be foreseen through late implementation of the directive, limited transition periods can be accepted to allow candidate countries to design and adapt environmentally effective and economically efficient systems for collection and treatment of waste, as well as financing schemes, to local and affordable conditions. But such systems and schemes should be in place upon accession.

| Measures requested  | Country        | UNICE Position on the request                                   | Motivation/comment   |
|---|----------------|---|--|
| 2-year transition period for achievement of the target values for recovery and recycling of packaging (article 6) | Czech Republic | Acceptable {x}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {}              | No significant impact on the Internal Market or on competition is to be expected.  |
| 3 years transition period for fulfilment of recovery and recycling quota  | Cyprus         | Acceptable {x}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {}              | No significant impact on the Internal Market or on competition is to be expected.  |
| Request to introduce gradually for two years after accession the recovery and recycling quota                     | Hungary        | Acceptable {x}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {}              | No significant impact on the Internal Market or on competition is to be expected.  |
| 5-year transition period for implementation   | Poland         | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {x}<br>Unacceptable {}              | The transition period requested is longer than those of other candidate countries, due to the fact that Poland has proposed very challenging targets and that no system is in place yet. It should be shortened. |
| 6-year transition period for implementation   | Lithuania      | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {x} <sup>5</sup><br>Unacceptable {} | The transition period requested is longer than those of other candidate countries. It should be shortened.   |
| Unspecified transition period for implementation  | Slovenia       | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {x}              | When the time of the request is specified, it is negotiable or acceptable depending on its length.   |

<sup>5</sup> Even though the measure requested exceeds the maximum five-year period for transitional periods suggested by UNICE the substance of the request is negotiable.



### 3.6.2 Discharge of dangerous substances: Directive 76/464/EEC

The directive imposes costs on companies and therefore affects the conditions for business. Long transition periods could have a significant impact on competition. Its effects on human health are significant and it has a trans-boundary impact. Thus, the directive should be treated with priority. Quick implementation is necessary. However, when negotiating the implementation of the directive, additional requirements and deadlines imposed by the new Water Framework Directive will have to be taken into account.

| Measures requested  | Country        | UNICE Position on the request                                   | Motivation/comment   |
|---|----------------|---|--|
| Transition period of undefined length for implementation (into surface water)                                 | Czech Republic | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {x}              | Length of request must be specified.   |
| Four-year transition period for implementation  | Estonia        | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {x}<br>Unacceptable {}              | Length of request should be reduced. For discharges into groundwater from a production process, transition periods must be very limited considering the potential impact on competition. |
| Transition periods for implementation:<br>* Into surface water: seven years<br>* Into groundwater: five years | Hungary        | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {x} <sup>6</sup><br>Unacceptable {} | Length of request should be reduced. For discharges into groundwater from a production process, transition periods must be very limited considering the potential impact on competition. |
| Transition period for implementation of unspecified duration  | Poland         | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {x}              | Length of request must be specified. For discharges into groundwater from a production process, transition periods must be very limited considering the potential impact on competition. |

### 3.6.3 Integrated pollution prevention and control: Directive 96/61/EC

The directive imposes costs on companies and therefore affects the conditions for business. Long transition periods could have a significant impact on competition. Requests for transition periods regarding specific existing installations are negotiable for as long as eight years, limited to those parts of the directive where current member states have eight years to comply (art 5.1). For other parts of the directive, five-year transition periods could be negotiated. Transitional measures for new installations, however, are unacceptable.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

| Measures requested  | Country        | UNICE Position on the request                      | Motivation/comment   |
|---|----------------|--|--|
| 5-year transition period for implementation                       | Czech Republic | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {X}<br>Unacceptable {} | It should be specified which existing plants are to be covered, and a detailed timetable with interim targets should be presented. |
| 5-year transition period for implementation                       | Hungary        | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {X}<br>Unacceptable {} | It should be specified which existing plants are to be covered, and a detailed timetable with interim targets should be presented. |
| 3-year transition period for implementation                       | Poland         | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {X}<br>Unacceptable {} | It should be specified which existing plants are to be covered, and a detailed timetable with interim targets should be presented. |
| 4-year transition period for implementation in 15 existing plants | Slovenia       | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {X}<br>Unacceptable {} | It should be specified which existing plants are to be covered, and a detailed timetable with interim targets should be presented. |

### 3.6.4 Control of volatile organic compound emissions: Directive 94/63/EC

The directive imposes costs on companies and therefore affects the conditions for business. Long transition periods could have a significant impact on competition. In general, requests for transition periods regarding specific existing installations are negotiable for as long as 8 years, the same as current Member States have for compliance. Transitional measures for new installations, however, are unacceptable.

| Measures requested   | Country   | UNICE Position on the request                                   | Motivation/comment  |
|--|-----------|---|---|
| 1-4 years transition period for implementation                         | Estonia   | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {X}<br>Unacceptable {}              | The time period needs to be specified.                        |
| 7-year transition period for storage of VOC for existing installations | Poland    | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {X} <sup>7</sup><br>Unacceptable {} | The duration of the transitional measure should be shortened. |
| 7-year transition period for implementation                            | Lithuania | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {X} <sup>8</sup><br>Unacceptable {} | The duration of the transitional measure should be shortened. |

### 3.6.5 Landfill of waste: Directive 1999/31/EC

The directive is important for protection of the environment and human health and should be implemented in good time. Long transition periods could have a significant impact on shipment of waste and competition. Transitional measures for new installations are unacceptable. Transition periods for existing installations should be short and accompanied by a detailed action plan, since the directive foresees negotiations on transition periods for existing landfills in Member States as well as on an implementation plan between the permitting authorities and landfill operator.

<sup>7</sup> Even though the measure requested exceeds the maximum five-year period for transitional periods suggested by UNICE the substance of the request is negotiable.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

| Measures requested                                 | Country   | UNICE Position on the request                                   | Motivation/comment  |
|--|-----------|---|---|
| Transition period for 4-7 years for implementation | Estonia   | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {x} <sup>9</sup><br>Unacceptable {} | The duration of the transition period should be specified, and an action plan for implementation of the directive presented.  |
| 12-year transition period for implementation       | Lithuania | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {x}              | The duration of the transition period should be shortened, and an action plan for implementation of the directive presented.  |
| Reservations on implementation                     | Hungary   | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {x}<br>Unacceptable {}              | If a concrete transition period is requested at a later stage in the negotiation process, it should be short and completed by an action plan for implementation of the directive. |

### 3.6.6 Air pollution from industrial plants: Directive 84/360/EEC

The directive imposes costs on companies and therefore affects the conditions for business. Combating air pollution is addressed in several European Directives that will be in force before entry of candidate countries and therefore negotiations on one of these directives should be conducted in the context of the other directives to ensure environmentally effective air pollution abatement in a coherent way.

| Measures requested   | Country | UNICE Position on request                          | Motivation/comment   |
|--|---------|--|--|
| Request to allow existing (in operation on 1 January 2002 or built or authorised before that date) industrial plants and large combustion plants not to meet certain air pollution norms | Hungary | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {x} | The duration of the transition period and exempted industrial plants should be specified, and an action plan with interim targets for implementation of the directive presented. |

### 3.6.7 Incineration of hazardous waste: Directive 94/67/EC

The directive is important for protection of the environment and human health and should be implemented in good time. Long transition periods could have a significant impact on shipment of waste and competition. In general, requests for transition periods regarding specific existing installations are negotiable for as long as five years, which is the time current Member States have for compliance. Transitional measures for new installations, however, are unacceptable.

<sup>9</sup> Even though the measure requested exceeds the maximum five-year period for transitional periods suggested by UNICE the substance of the request is negotiable.

| Measures requested  | Country | UNICE Position on request                          | Motivation/comment   |
|---|---------|--|--|
| Request to allow existing incineration plants (a plant for which the permit to operate was granted before 31 December 2001) not to comply with rules on the incineration of hazardous waste | Hungary | Acceptable {}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {x} | The duration of the transition period should be specified, and an action plan for implementation of the directive presented. |

### 3.6.8 Substances that deplete the ozone layer: regulation 3093/94/EC

Since ozone-depleting substances represent a trans-boundary problem, in general quick implementation must be targeted from an environmental point of view. From an economic point of view, long transition periods could have a significant impact on competition.

| Measures requested  | Country | UNICE Position on request                          | Motivation   |
|---|---------|--|--|
| Three-year transition period for the implementation of provisions relating to the use of HCFCs and methyl bromide, given the economic problems of companies which apply controlled substances, and the expected adverse social effects related to the earlier phase-out of HCFCs and methyl bromide (the necessity of shutting down technological lines and, as a result, of laying off workers). | Poland  | Acceptable {x}<br>Negotiable {}<br>Unacceptable {} | Considering the limited length of the measure requested, it will most likely not have any significant impact on competition or the functioning of the internal market. |

Annex

ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS – STATE OF PLAY\*

**CHAPTERS OPEN AND CLOSED BY CANDIDATE COUNTRIES - APRIL 2001**

| Chapter/country        | EE        | PL        | SI        | CZ        | HU        | CY        | BG        | LV        | LT        | MT        | RO        | SK        |
|------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 1. Free m. goods       | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         |           |           |           | ⌘         |
| 2. F. m. people        | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           |           |           |           |           |           |
| 3. F. m. services      | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           |           | ⌘         |
| 4. F. m. capital       | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         |
| 5. Company law         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |
| 6. Competition         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |
| 7. Agriculture         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           |           |           | ⌘         |           |           |
| 8. Fisheries           | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         |
| 9. Transport policy    | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         |
| 10. Taxation           | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           |           |           |           |           |           |
| 11. EMU                | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         |
| 12. Statistics         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |
| 13. Social & Empl      | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         |
| 14. Energy             | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         |           |           |           |           |
| 15. Industr. policy    | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         |
| 16. SMEs               | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |
| 17. Science & res.     | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |
| 18. Edu & training     | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |
| 19. Telecom & IT       | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |
| 20. Cult & audiov.     | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |
| 21. Region. policy     | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         | ⌘         |           |           | ⌘         |
| 22. Environment        | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         | ⌘         |           |           | ⌘         |
| 23. Consumers          | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         |
| 24. JHA                | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           |           |           |           |           |           |
| 25. Customs Union      | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         | ⌘         |           |           | ⌘         |
| 26. Ext. Relations     | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |
| 27. CFSP               | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |
| 28. Financ. control    | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           |           |           | ⌘         |           |           |
| 29. Fin. & budget      | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         | ⌘         |           | ⌘         | ⌘         |           |           | ⌘         |
| 30. Institutions       |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |
| 31. Other              |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |
| <b>Closed chapters</b> | <b>18</b> | <b>15</b> | <b>18</b> | <b>15</b> | <b>17</b> | <b>18</b> | <b>8</b>  | <b>11</b> | <b>13</b> | <b>13</b> | <b>6</b>  | <b>12</b> |
| <b>Cand. country</b>   | <b>EE</b> | <b>PL</b> | <b>SI</b> | <b>CZ</b> | <b>HU</b> | <b>CY</b> | <b>BG</b> | <b>LV</b> | <b>LT</b> | <b>MT</b> | <b>RO</b> | <b>SK</b> |

⌘ = Chapter provisionally closed; ⌘ = chapter open

\* Unofficial table compiled by UNICE secretariat